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The OPEC cartel was formed to promote two economic goals, one microeconomic — low oil market
volatility — the other macroeconomic — promotes economic development of its members. These goals
create a tension since the cartel's single tool is output quotas. Using this dual micro/macro perspective we
analyze oil exporting countries' behavior. We find that the effects of the cartel's choices will be reflected in
oil market stability, long-term macroeconomic development, and international oil market structure. If an oil
producing country cares about both oil industry profits and macroeconomic stability, the goal of output
stability may be inconsistent with cartel membership.
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OPEC is an international Organization of eleven developing countries which are heavily0167-7
doi:10.reliant on oil revenues as their main source of income. Membership is open to any country
which is a substantial net exporter of oil and which shares the ideals of the Organization.Since oil revenues are so vital for the economic development of these nations, they aim to
bring stability and harmony to the oil market by adjusting their oil output to help ensure a
balance between supply and demand.
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188 J. Noguera, R.A. Pecchecnino / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 25 (2007) 187–199The OPEC cartel was formed to promote two economic goals, one microeconomic — the
minimization of the volatility of oil markets— the other macroeconomic— the promotion of the
economic development of its member countries. These two goals create a tension since the cartel
has only a single tool, output quotas, with which to achieve these goals. Thus, it is forced to
weight them. The effects of its choices will be reflected in the stability of the oil market, in long-
term macroeconomic development, and in the states' decisions to join or withdraw from the
cartel, that is, in international oil market structure. Using this dual micro/macro perspective we
analyze OPEC's sometimes perplexing (see Griffin, 1985; Griffin and Xiong, 1997; Loderer,
1985) behavior.
Specifically, in this paper we ask a straightforward question — is it possible for OPEC to
achieve its stated goals? That is, can an international resource cartel using the standard
microeconomic pricing and enforcement mechanisms provide a macroeconomic environment
conducive to development and growth? Since the oil sector represents an important share of
national income for oil exporting, developing countries, instability in the oil market also can lead
to instability in output, and through the Phillips curve, instability in other macroeconomic
indicators like inflation; in other words, it can lead to macroeconomic instability. Thus, has OPEC
been a useful tool explicitly to achieve oil market, and, implicitly, macroeconomic stability? If the
answer to both these questions is no, what is the rationale for OPEC to continue to exist? That is,
can oil exporting developing countries improve their development prospects by joining an oil
cartel? If so, since all substantial oil exporters can choose to join, why do some important
exporting countries like Mexico, Oman, Angola and, perhaps, Russia, whose production and
development levels are similar to other countries in OPEC, choose to stay in the fringe? What
induces countries like Ecuador to enter and then exit shortly thereafter? Why do Mexico, Russia,
Egypt and Kazakhstan find membership inconsistent with their domestic macroeconomic policies
if membership is, indeed, intended to promote economic development?
There are two important features of the international oil market worthy of mention. First, the
OPEC cartel meets twice a year and in extraordinary sessions whenever necessary. In these
meetings, the cartel analyzes the state of the international oil market, and sets quotas for its
member states (see www.opec.com). Thus, OPEC tries to move (preempt) the market rather than
be moved by it. OPEC's production represents about 40% of total world oil production. Among
non-OPEC producers, Russia's production is 12% of world production, and no other country
produces even 5% of the total. This means that the international oil market operates as a
Stackleberg oligopoly where the OPEC cartel plays the role of the leader. A final important
feature that distinguishes the oil cartel from most (if not all) other cartels is that governments, not
firms, make the decision about joining the cartel, and it is government ministers who set
production quotas.
Taking these features as assumptions, we answer the above questions in the context of a simple
model in which oil producing countries choose either to join OPEC or remain part of the fringe.
Equilibrium is stable and thus cartel members have no temptation to cheat. OPEC acts as a
Stackleberg leader, and reacts to market shocks by setting output quotas for its members. We find
that if oil producing country governments care predominately about high oil sector profits, the
standard microeconomic assumption, then joining the cartel is the optimal strategy. But countries
in the cartel will have more volatile oil production than those in the fringe and, thus, via the link
between the oil sector and the macroeconomy, higher macroeconomic instability. Therefore, if
these same governments care about macroeconomic stability as well as oil sector profits, then the
choice to join the cartel will depend on the intensity of this preference: the more a government
cares about macroeconomic stability, the less inclined it is, in general, to be a cartel member.
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stability, the goal of output stability may be inconsistent with cartel membership. Thus, OPEC's
membership will be lower than standard analysis would suggest. OPEC's dilemma is that it
cannot obtain both its expressed goals with the single tool, setting output quotas, it has at its
disposal. And, should it weight the microeconomic goal more heavily, OPEC economies will
stagnate.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first provide a brief discussion of the economic
performance of the OPECmember states, and examine OPEC's ability to influence the oil market.
We then examine how OPEC's objectives — as specified in its mission statement — could be
operationalized, write down a model of the cartel, and analyze its behavior. Finally, we summarize
and interpret our results.
1. The OPEC economies
OPEC was established in 1960 to take sovereign control over oil resources, and to ensure that
the interests of oil producing countries would be well represented in world markets. The founding
members of OPEC felt that their economies were at the mercy of the oil companies, and that they
were not being adequately compensated for the oil the companies were extracting, exporting, and
refining. By design, OPEC was to establish orderly oil markets with stable prices and to promote
the economic development of its member states. OPEC's mission differentiates it from a narrowly
defined cartel under which joint profits are maximized. That OPEC does not behave strictly like a
narrowly defined cartel has been found by Griffin (1985), Griffin and Xiong (1997), and Loderer
(1985), among others. Their results could be explained, in part, by OPEC's broader goals.
In comparison with other developing economies, the immensely oil rich economies have
underperformed. Their economies are characterized by very high population growth rates and
high rates of oil dependence both in terms of personal income and public finance. High extraction
rates have led to falling oil reserves. In many OPEC member countries, investment, even in the oil
sector, is low. Cordesman (1999) argues that many oil states do not even have the resources to
develop their own oil and gas reserves. Yet because of the high level of oil dependence, the oil
sector must perform well both to maintain current and ensure future living standards (Morrison,
2004). But, oil sector and overall economic productivity in the OPEC economies has declined,
and today less rather than more is being produced with the same resources.
This economic decline has been interpreted by some as evidence that the OPEC economies
have been victims of the resource curse (Auty, 2001; Eastwood and Venables, 1982; Gylfason,
2001; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Stevens, 2003), the apparently
anomalous empirical finding that many resource rich countries underperform their resource poor
peers. The reasons given for the curse are many: decline in the terms of trade, revenue volatility,
the Dutch disease, crowding out, government mismanagement, rent seeking, corruption, etc. But,
the end result is the same — relative poverty in the midst of plenty.
We suggest, in contrast, that some of the blame for the economic decline may lie in the cartel
rather than in the resources it allocates. While OPEC, at least in principle, can adjust supply to
maintain targeted (nominal) oil prices to maximize oil firm profits, it has not been able to control
the market adequately to ensure a steady stream of oil derived revenues, that is, national income
and so macroeconomic stability. For example, Venezuela's public sector oil revenues were 27% of
GDP in 1996 but only 12.5% in 1998 (Barnett and Ossowski, 2003). The orderly market, the
supposed empirical manifestation of a profit oriented pricing policy, is claimed to be a reality
(Jalali-Naini and Asali, 2004), but the implied macroeconomic benefits to OPEC members are
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and the cartel strategy appeared to work. Yet, with the high oil market volatility from the 1970s
on, the dual OPEC goals of long-term growth and development may not be achievable via the
unitary profit-oriented pricing policy.
2. Market equilibrium when stability does not matter
2.1. Assumptions
There is a continuum1 of petroleum producing countries distributed along the interval (1,N).
These oil industries are controlled by their governments.
There is a cartel of oil producers which governments can freely choose to join. Assume nc
countries belong to the cartel while nf =N−nc do not and remain in the fringe. Since oil output
in each country is determined by the number of wells drilled and the amount of oil
underground, it is reasonable to assume that each country's petroleum industry exhibits
constant returns to scale technology and has the same cost function, C=C(xti), where xti is
country i's petroleum production at period t. This means that oil production has constant
marginal costs. Oil prices are set according to the demand function Pt= f (Qt)+εt, where f ′b0
and f ″b0, Qt denotes the world oil production and εt is a random term whose expected value
is zero and variance is equal to σε
2. The profit function for the petroleum industry at time t in
country i is πti=Ptxti−C(xti), i∈ (1,N). Suppose, initially, that profits are the only concern;





ð1þ rÞt pti: ð1Þ
Assume that shocks are known before oil producers make output decisions, however, future
shocks are unknown.
2.2. The fringe
Firm f in the fringe takes the output of all other petroleum producers as given and maximizes
Eq. (1) to determine its own output. The first order condition for a country in the fringe is
f ðQ⁎t Þ þ et þ f VðQ⁎t Þx⁎if −CVðx⁎if Þ ¼ 0; ð2Þ
where the superscript “⁎” denotes the optimum choice. The second-order condition is:
2f VðQ⁎t Þ þ f WðQ⁎t Þx⁎if −CWðx⁎if Þb0 ðto be maximumÞ: ð3Þ
Solving Eq. (2), we obtain the follower's reaction function (country f ) to the cartel's move:
x⁎if ¼  f ðK
⁎
t ;etÞ; ð4Þ1 We assume the continuum modeling for analytical ease. This formulation enables us to avoid concentrating attention
on corner solutions that have no economic interest.




tc is the cartel's oil production in period t. Using Eq. (2), we obtain the partial
derivative of xtf with respect to Kt and denote it by ϕK




¼ − f VðQ
⁎
t Þ þ x⁎tf f WðQ⁎t Þ
2f VðQ⁎t Þ þ x⁎tf f WðQ⁎t Þ−CWðx⁎tf Þ
: ð5Þ
From Eq. (3), the denominator is negative, thus

f
Kb0 if and only if f VðQ⁎t Þ þ x⁎f f WðQ⁎t Þb0:
When reaction functions are upward sloping, ϕK
f N0, there is a situation in which followers copy
or undercut the leader like, for example, entrants undercutting the price of the incumbent in the
contestable market literature (Baumol, 1982) or followers in the development stage that invest
more than the leader and are thus more likely to collect a patent in a research and development
game (Reinganum, 1985). On the other hand, when reaction functions are downward sloping,
ϕK
f b0, the leader makes a preemptive move, like an incumbent firm that invests in excess supply
(Spence, 1979; Dixit, 1980). OPEC's operating procedure, semiannual plus extraordinary
meetings, is to preempt the market.
2.3. The cartel
For the sake of simplicity, assume that countries on the interval (1,nc] are in the cartel and
countries on the interval (nc,N] are in the fringe. The leader takes into account the follower's












f , the first order condition for every country c in the cartel is:
f ðQ⁎t Þ þ et þ K⁎t ð1þ nf fKÞf VðQ⁎t Þ−CVðx⁎tc Þ ¼ 0: ð6Þ
Since all countries are equal except for their membership in the cartel, we may consider
symmetric equilibria, so xtc is the same for every cartel member and xtf is the same for every
country in the fringe.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the slope of the reaction function ϕK
f is continuous, monotonic and
well-defined for 1bnc≤N; then there is a Nash equilibrium with cartel size equal to nc⁎ and the






. In that Nash
equilibrium, each country in the cartel produces the same amount of oil and obtains the same
profit as a country in the fringe, x⁎=xc⁎=xf⁎. That is, xc≥xf if and only if πc≥πf.2
To illustrate the theorem, consider Fig. 1, where for the sake of simplicity, we have assumed
that ϕK
f is constant. Although the assumption made in Theorem 1 about ϕK
f is more general, it
is noteworthy that ϕK
f is constant if the demand function is linear and oil exploitation technology
is constant returns to scale. Define BðncÞ ¼ 1−ncncðN−ncÞ and nc⁎ as the size of the cartel such that
B(nc⁎) =ϕK
f .2 All proofs are available from the authors upon request.
N ncnc
 φc





Fig. 1. The size of the cartel when stability does not matter.
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produces xc⁎bxf⁎. Once the cartel sets the quotas to target some price level, it is optimal for cartel
members to cheat, that is, to imitate producers in the fringe and thus increase their production. The
cartel's market power weakens and cheating countries do not benefit from those belonging to the
cartel. If cartel members are subject to some cost, like bargaining costs or moral punishments, they
are better off if they quit. On the other hand, if the cartel size is less than nc⁎, then xc⁎Nxf⁎ and profits
are higher for cartel members. Producers in the fringe will find it optimal to join the cartel to gain
from its market power. A Nash equilibrium is reached once the cartel has reached its optimal size
nc⁎where cartel members have no incentive to cheat since equilibrium output and profit is the same
for countries both in the cartel and the fringe. Therefore, the cartel solution is stable.
3. Market equilibrium when stability matters
In the previous section's analysis, we assume that decision makers only care about the oil firm
profits, and find a cartel size which constitutes a Nash equilibrium where there is no temptation to
cheat. In practice, however, governments make the decision about joining the oil cartel. Thus, if
membership in the cartel means more unstable production, a developing oil-exporting country's
government that cares about the oil production stability, and hence output stability, a standard
measure of macroeconomic stability, may decide to quit the cartel. Yet, why may a government
give weight to oil output stability in their objective function? There are several reasons.
First, the OPEC charter states that the cartel countries care not only about profits from the oil
industry, but also about creating an appropriate environment for investment and growth. Therefore,
since oil output volatility in oil exporting developing countries leads to volatility in national income, and
then through the Phillips curve in other macroeconomic variables, oil output stability must be an issue.
Second, when access to international capital markets is imperfect, countries face a trade-off
between higher oil profits and stable output. To illustrate this, letW ¼Pli¼0UðCtþiÞ be the inter-
temporal utility function of country i's representative agent, which is subject to a budget
constraint like Ct+Bt=Yt+(1+ r)Bt−1, where Bt is bonds, Yt is output and r is the real interest rate.
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path Ct=Ct−1=C. In this situation, individuals borrow when the oil market is down and vice
versa. Yet, if the country has no access to international capital markets, its local financial
institutions are weak, and/or it suffers from strong political business cycle problems, which is the
usual case in emerging markets (Jeanne, 2003; Litan et al., 2003; Sy, 2003), the consumption
smoothing path may not be feasible, and the solution to the maximization problem becomes
Ct=Yt, that is, consumption follows the cycle. Therefore, although joining the cartel may provide
a higher average income to the typical oil exporting developing country, it may also generate more
output volatility, which diminishes welfare. Therefore, the government faces a trade-off between
having higher income and greater oil output stability.
Third, for the typical oil-exporting developing country, if the government cares about
developing other industries, stability in the number of barrels produced also provides more
stability to the oil industry's local suppliers making investment in those related sectors less risky,
and thus helping the development of areas in which the country should have natural comparative
advantages. Finally, every time the oil industry adjusts output, lays off workers, and generates a
multiplier effect causing still more jobs to be lost. Thus, a government that cares about
employment stability should worry about stabilizing the number of barrels of oil it produces. 3
Therefore, since the cartel implicitly determines the output level at which profits and thus income
are maximized by setting the number of barrels extracted, it is reasonable to define the following





Here βi is the time-preference parameter for country i, πis is the oil firms' profit, the term (xi,s−1−
x¯ i)
2 accounts for the loss due to the instability in the oil production (a proxy for the variance of the
GDP gap), and δi weights the government's dislike of oil output instability in the objective
function, that is, δi is the instability aversion parameter. With this objective function, Eqs. (2) and
(6) become:
f ðQ⁎t Þ þ et þ f VðQ⁎t Þx⁎if −CVðx⁎if Þ ¼ 2bf df ðx⁎if −x¯ f Þ and ð7aÞ
f ðQ⁎t Þ þ et þ K⁎t ð1þ nf fKÞf VðQ⁎t Þ−CVðx⁎tc Þ ¼ 2bcdcðx⁎tc−x¯⁎c Þ; ð7bÞ
where x¯ i and π¯ i denote country i's optimal oil production and the profits of the oil industry in
steady state equilibrium, respectively.
Theorem 2. When the government values oil sector stability, then:





ii) given nc⁎, then x¯c and x¯ f, and thus π¯c and π¯f are independent of β and δ.Theorem 3. i) Oil output is positively correlated across countries.
ii) The oil output variance is a decreasing function of the time preference
parameter (β) and the instability aversion parameter (δ).3 Even though every country has an important non-traded sector, the arguments above apply even if oil were the only







Fig. 2. Equilibrium cartel size.
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by increasing output. It also means that volatility in oil production decreases the higher the time
preference parameter (higher β), and the stronger the government's instability aversion (higher δ).
Thus, care for output stability reduces a countries' willingness to accept a highly variable production
quota. These facts may induce governments to change their decision about joining the cartel.
Theorem 4. Assume that oil production exhibits constant returns to scale, that the reaction
functions are negatively sloped, and that δN0. Consider two identical producers except that one
belongs to the cartel and the other is in the fringe, then:
i) the oil output variance is higher for a producer in the cartel than the identical producer in
the fringe σc
2−σf2N0;
ii) the difference σc
2−σf2 is a decreasing function of β and δ; and
iii) the difference between the average profit for the producer in the cartel and the producer in
the fringe, π¯c− π¯f, decreases as the cartel size increases.
The intuition behind this result is that the cartel uses its higher market power to obtain a higher
profit as it faces a demand shock. When gain is lower the more a country cares for output stability.
Consider a country deciding whether or not to join the cartel from period t on. The expected
profit of the oil industry is π¯c if it joins the cartel, or π¯f if it stays in the fringe. Country i's objective
function can be written as
Vi ¼ 11−bi
½p¯ i−dir2i ðbi; diÞ:
Let Vc denote the country's net gain if it joins the cartel and Vf if it stays in the fringe. Country i
joins the cartel if VcNVf, that is, if





All countries join the Cartel















Fig. 3. Equilibrium cartel size. (a) Equilibrium when the output variance is high. (b) Equilibrium when the output variance
is low.
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2(β,δ)−σf2(β,δ)]. The term (π¯c− π¯f) measures the gain in expected profits and Z
(β,δ) measures the loss due to output instability if the country is in the cartel instead of in the
fringe. From Theorem 4, the difference (π¯c− π¯f) is a decreasing function of nc that cuts the axis at
nc=nc⁎, as shown in Fig. 2. The number of countries that join the cartel depends on the countries'
distribution across the parameters β and δ.
To get some insights, define the index set for the N countries in such a way that Z(βi,δi) is a
continuous increasing function of i∈ (0,N). From Fig. 2, we observe that inequality (8) holds for
the first nc⁎⁎ countries; those with ibnc⁎⁎ join the cartel, and the other nf⁎⁎=N−nc⁎⁎ remain in the
fringe. From (ii) of Theorem 4, Z(β,δ)≥0, and thus there exists an equilibrium in which some
producers join the cartel and some others decide to stay in the fringe. If δ=0, then Z(β,δ)=0 and
equilibrium is reached when the cartel size equals nc⁎ as in Theorem 1. Yet, if δN0, equilibrium is
reached for a cartel size equal to nc⁎⁎ smaller than nc⁎, that is, the cartel size is smaller when some
countries prefer output stability.
The dynamics of the cartel in this model can be seen as a repeated game, where players are free
to choose the strategy of whether or not to join the cartel; they are free to “cheat” and condition (8)
defines equilibrium. Consider a country that joins the cartel, so Eq. (8) holds. If the country
Table 1
Instability in oil exporting countries
Sorted by S.D. of oil output Sorted by S.D. of consumption/GDP
Russia Fringe 2.10 U.K. Fringe 0.022
Indonesia OPEC 2.23 Denmark Fringe 0.025
Syria Fringe 2.28 Ecuador Fringe 0.026
Bahrain Fringe 2.67 Norway Fringe 0.036
Yemen Fringe 3.37 Venezuela OPEC 0.037
Kazakhstan Fringe 3.50 Cameroon Fringe 0.040
Gabon Fringe 4.13 Canada Fringe 0.044
Canada Fringe 4.25 Colombia Fringe 0.044
Norway Fringe 4.34 Mexico Fringe 0.047
Mexico Fringe 4.39 Indonesia OPEC 0.048
Ecuador Fringe 4.53 Syria Fringe 0.053
Nigeria OPEC 4.71 Malaysia Fringe 0.057
Congo (Brazzaville) Fringe 4.85 Algeria OPEC 0.066
Malaysia Fringe 4.99 Trinidad and Tobago Fringe 0.070
Cameroon Fringe 5.20 Vietnam Fringe 0.075
Egypt Fringe 5.76 Egypt Fringe 0.078
Oman Fringe 5.97 Gabon Fringe 0.082
Iran OPEC 6.10 Kazakhstan Fringe 0.085
Libya OPEC 6.20 Libya OPEC 0.097
Trinidad and Tobago Fringe 7.22 Yemen Fringe 0.100
U.K. Fringe 7.58 Nigeria OPEC 0.105
Vietnam Fringe 8.73 Iran OPEC 0.109
United Arab Emirates OPEC 9.77 United Arab Emirates OPEC 0.111
Saudi Arabia OPEC 9.79 Qatar OPEC 0.113
Colombia Fringe 10.05 Oman Fringe 0.113
Venezuela OPEC 10.12 Bahrain Fringe 0.119
Qatar OPEC 10.27 Saudi Arabia OPEC 0.119
Kuwait OPEC 10.36 Russia Fringe 0.119
Algeria OPEC 10.45 Congo (Brazzaville) Fringe 0.152
Denmark Fringe 12.97 Kuwait OPEC 0.476
Data source: International Energy Annual Report, Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, IFS/
IMF, and own computations.
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does not maximize Eq. (1) and thus it will be worse off: the cartel is internally stable. Similarly, a
country in the fringe will not want to imitate a country in the cartel since the cost in output
instability is too high. Therefore, a country joins the cartel if it is committed to keep its quota, and
thus the cartel solution defined by Eq. (8) is a stable equilibrium.4
What are the features of those countries that join the cartel? Given δ, from (ii) of Theorem 4,
σc
2−σf2 is a decreasing function of time-preference factor β. Therefore, countries with a low time-
preference factor β, which have a strong preference for current consumption and low investment-
output ratios, give little importance to future losses due to output instability, and so Z(β,δ) is small.
For them, inequality (8) holds. They are likely to join the cartel.
The analysis of the parameter δ requires a more detailed analysis. Given β, since σc
2−σf2 is a
decreasing function of δ,Z(β,δ) has the shape shown in Fig. 3(a). Thus, countrieswith either low δ (bδ1)4 Here we follow the definition of a stable cartel as suggested in D'Aspremont et al. (1983), Donsimoni et al. (1986),
Jacquemin and Slade (1989) and Marette and Crespi (2003).
Table 2
ML-binary probit
Includes Indonesia Excludes Indonesia
Variable Coefficient p-values Variable Coefficient p-values
C −2.79 0.0052 C −5.48 0.006
S.D. oil output index 0.19 0.0334 OILVAR 0.39 0.011
S.D. oil consumption/GDP 13.45 0.0868 CYVAR 27.09 0.028
McFadden R-squared: 0.24 McFadden R-squared: 0.44
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stability, caringmore for oil sector profits. On the other hand, countries with a very high δ havemuch to
lose from oil production instability, and will join the cartel only if their quota is insensitive to demand
shocks, diminishing the instability effect. The cartel offers the high δ countries production stability, but
at the cost of oil sector profits, while offering low δ countries greater production instability but higher
oil sector profits. Both types of producers benefit. Middling δ countries do better staying in the fringe.
Finally, let us consider the effect of market volatility on the cartel size. It is apparent that Z(β,δ)
is a decreasing function of the variance of ε; thus, if the oil market is very unstable, the variance of
ε is big, and equilibrium will be as shown in Fig. 3(a), where some countries find it beneficial to
join the cartel and others do not. Yet, if market volatility is low and the variance of ε is too small, Z
(β,δ) will be as shown in Fig. 3(b), and all countries join the cartel.
4. Some empirical findings
From inequality (8), cartel countries are those who either care the least or the most about
instability. If this is so, among oil exporters, OPEC countries should show either the highest or the
lowest volatility in oil production. Table 1 shows the standard deviation of either oil output or
consumption/GDP ratio of 30 oil exporting countries for which data are available. Standard
deviations for oil output and the consumption/GDP ratio are computed for the periods 1999–2003
and 1980–2003, respectively. To avoid distortion due to the different production volume across
countries, we compute variance of the oil output index and not the volume.
Observe that most OPEC countries are in the bottom half of the table, that is, they are among
the most volatile in the sample. Indonesia is an exception, as it is the second with low oil output
volatility. This suggests that Indonesia could be the only country choosing to join the cartel
because of its strong dislike of instability.
Formally, we estimate a probit model for whether or not a country is a member of OPEC, see
Table 2. The dependent variable “OPEC” is one if the country belongs to the cartel. Since
Indonesia seems to be an exception, we compute two regressions, one including and the other
excluding Indonesia. Results are as expected. In both cases, p-values show that coefficients are
significant. However, significance strongly increases as we drop Indonesia from the sample.
Coefficients are positive, meaning that higher variance increases the probability of joining the
cartel.
5. Conclusions
A distinguishing feature of the international oil market is that the decision about joining the
OPEC cartel is not taken by firms, but by governments that take macroeconomic considerations,
namely development and stabilization, into account. This essay studies the issue of whether the
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which oil exporting, developing countries decide whether or not to join the cartel. The model
leads to three important conclusions. The first is that countries with a strong preference for current
oil revenue, perhaps to fund high levels of current income, join the cartel. The reasons for this
preference may vary across countries: in Kuwait, for instance, it may be due to the high
population growth rate (4.9% annually during the last 10 years), while in Iraq it may have been
due to the need for current income to finance several wars during Saddam's regime. A strong
preference for current consumption (low β) is reflected in relatively low investment/output ratios
and poor economic performance in terms of long term per capita output growth. This could
account for the economic performance in countries like Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia or Venezuela, whose investment/output ratios have been less than 20% during the last
decade. The decision to join the cartel and the exigencies of cartel, as opposed to macroeconomic,
stability has cursed rather than blessed them.
Second, since the oil-output variance is a source of output instability, countries with very large
non-oil sectors or that are highly vulnerable to the oil output variance (high δ) are better off
enjoying cartel prices and at the same time having low oil-output variances. Therefore, if their
quotas exhibit low variances, it would be beneficial for them to join the cartel. This could explain
Indonesia's OPEC membership, since their oil production to GDP ratios are small and the
correlations between their oil production and the cartel's are rather low. Finally, we conclude that
all oil exporting countries would find it beneficial to join the cartel if the volatility of the oil
market were low. This could explain why, for example, when OPEC was set up in the early 1960s,
all important oil exporters at that time joined the cartel, and why many of these countries enjoyed
high growth rates during the 1960s. The case of Venezuela exemplifies this. After enjoying an
average growth rate above 5% per year between 1945 and 1973, one of the highest growth rates in
the world, its average growth rate from 1978 on, just after the oil market volatility became a
serious concern for producing countries, has been close to zero.
What about the countries in the fringe?All producers whose oil exports are less than 600 thousand
barrels per day are in the fringe. However, except for Denmark, oil production is still an important
share of their GDPs. Thus, they can take advantage of oil industry windfalls generated by the cartel's
leadership role without being members of the cartel. But, this is at the recognized cost of letting their
non-oil sector suffer the swings of the oil market. This could be also the case for Russia, Mexico and
Angola, whose oil output variances are moderately correlated with OPEC.
IsOPEC an appropriate tool to foster economic development? In an oil market with low volatility,
like that prevailing before the 1970s, oil exporting countries may enjoy a high flow of financial
resources and enoughmacroeconomic stability to foster investment and development; this could also
be the case of countries like Indonesia,whose oil sector enjoys the advantages of cartel prices, but has
a low variance quota inside the cartel that benefits its large non-oil sector. Yet, this is not the case in
the volatile oil market of today, where the non-oil sectors of OPEC countries are hindered because of
OPEC's hunger for current profits and its having only a single tool to meet two disparate goals. For
these countries, currently optimal profligacy begets future decline.
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